Thursday, September 24, 2009
Friday, September 18, 2009
By the pricking of my thumb...
... something in a kanga this way has come.
By the way - next time I bite my thumbnail, the very last bit of election stain will vanish from me. I fear that this'll happen soon, as I've manufactured some stress for myself. So here - without warning - are my warning flags for the "new" administration.
1. 100 daze - The first 100 days are a phoney marker, but by now we have a sense of how the rest of the first term will unfold. This is a list of things to look out for.
2. Red alert How Red will Zuma be? This question is exaggerated by several factors. First is the latent paranoia of those of us who still seek the red peril, after all these years. Second is the state of the Communist Party itself. The only Red pressure is from Blade Nzimande, so as long as he's onside, his party's under control. Conversely, when he's been sidelined, the phantom party he's been fronting can be safely (perhaps permanently) ignored. Which brings us to...
3. COSATU We don't know the nature of the pressure that COSATU will exert on the regime, since all we see of the union is its Secretary. Under the surface, there's a lot more support for centrist positions that Vavi's rambling would suggest. So COSATU needs to resolve. If Vavi's grip on it intensifies, there's the potential for increased pressure. But it's only potential, because union bargaining power is limited (by fatigue, largely.) If it loosens, then COSATU will democratise, and offer less of a coherent threat to government (largely because it will focus on the rather more boring bread-and-butter of industrial engagement.)
4. Style Zuma's style is based on survival, rather than advocacy. He doesn't stand for anything as doggedly as his predecessor. This makes him rather more prone to influence. And open to bargaining. At this point the ANC's internal king-makers are the chief candidates for the bending of the presidential ear. This explains why the succession debate has hotted up so quickly within the alliance. Under Mbeki, apparatchiks would get somewhere by convincing the big man of their attractiveness as hatcheteers. Under Zuma, you have to show that his survival is in your hands. COSATU is next in line.
5. Crime This will continue the trajectory of the last fifteen years. If there are silver bullets waiting to be executed, Zuma is unaware of them, and we shouldn't count on their immediate entry mshini yakhe (into the Presidential machine gun) upon discovery. The experience over the last decade and a half is one of spiraling crime, followed by a gradual downward management.
6. AIDS See "Crime" above. The chief constraint is money, and coverage will expand in line with a reduction in costs. So the trajectory of the last 15 years will continue: increased coverage in tandem with cost reduction and the building (first!) of administrative capacity. The focus, as always, will be on prevention, rather than treatment. The marker for all of this will be the evolution of the government's medium term treatment plan. Historically it's improved as it's become more doable. This'll go on...
7. Zimbabwe Two differences: Firstly, there will be some condemnatory rhetoric, outsourced to the ANC. Secondly, SA mediation will decrease. In regard o the first difference, boistrous rhetoric has never come easily to Zuma. In the (highly unlikely) event that he reverts to "hard diplomacy" this must be read as a sign of presidential weakness (i.e. he's caving in to pressure, rather than instinct). He is a skilled negotiator, with an impressive track record, and knows better than that. The second difference is largely because that mediation has run its course.
8. Foreign Affairs Same trajectory, but with less energy. Foreign policy was Mbeki's baby, but it isn't Zuma's.
9. Liberalism We've already seen the signs of encroaching conservatism. It's too depressing to elaborate. But the president surrounds himself with people to whom liberal rights are nice-to-haves, rather than necessities.
10. The opposition Zuma has done very well at not being Mbeki. The newer you are, the easier it is to play the difference gambit. But as you're steeped deeper into your own regime, the opposition forget about their grudge against your predecessor, and hone resentment focussed on you. Time passes between when you've offered to listen carefully to their concerns, and when you've (still not) actioned them. In the end it becomes clear (as it should have been at the start) that they weren't looking to be listened to. They wanted to be obeyed. You then have to break the news that this won't happen. The chats become less cordial.
I anticipate that within two years Zuma will have lost his reputation as an engaging listener. For action-oriented reasons.
I could go on, but my nails need biting...
By the way - next time I bite my thumbnail, the very last bit of election stain will vanish from me. I fear that this'll happen soon, as I've manufactured some stress for myself. So here - without warning - are my warning flags for the "new" administration.
1. 100 daze - The first 100 days are a phoney marker, but by now we have a sense of how the rest of the first term will unfold. This is a list of things to look out for.
2. Red alert How Red will Zuma be? This question is exaggerated by several factors. First is the latent paranoia of those of us who still seek the red peril, after all these years. Second is the state of the Communist Party itself. The only Red pressure is from Blade Nzimande, so as long as he's onside, his party's under control. Conversely, when he's been sidelined, the phantom party he's been fronting can be safely (perhaps permanently) ignored. Which brings us to...
3. COSATU We don't know the nature of the pressure that COSATU will exert on the regime, since all we see of the union is its Secretary. Under the surface, there's a lot more support for centrist positions that Vavi's rambling would suggest. So COSATU needs to resolve. If Vavi's grip on it intensifies, there's the potential for increased pressure. But it's only potential, because union bargaining power is limited (by fatigue, largely.) If it loosens, then COSATU will democratise, and offer less of a coherent threat to government (largely because it will focus on the rather more boring bread-and-butter of industrial engagement.)
4. Style Zuma's style is based on survival, rather than advocacy. He doesn't stand for anything as doggedly as his predecessor. This makes him rather more prone to influence. And open to bargaining. At this point the ANC's internal king-makers are the chief candidates for the bending of the presidential ear. This explains why the succession debate has hotted up so quickly within the alliance. Under Mbeki, apparatchiks would get somewhere by convincing the big man of their attractiveness as hatcheteers. Under Zuma, you have to show that his survival is in your hands. COSATU is next in line.
5. Crime This will continue the trajectory of the last fifteen years. If there are silver bullets waiting to be executed, Zuma is unaware of them, and we shouldn't count on their immediate entry mshini yakhe (into the Presidential machine gun) upon discovery. The experience over the last decade and a half is one of spiraling crime, followed by a gradual downward management.
6. AIDS See "Crime" above. The chief constraint is money, and coverage will expand in line with a reduction in costs. So the trajectory of the last 15 years will continue: increased coverage in tandem with cost reduction and the building (first!) of administrative capacity. The focus, as always, will be on prevention, rather than treatment. The marker for all of this will be the evolution of the government's medium term treatment plan. Historically it's improved as it's become more doable. This'll go on...
7. Zimbabwe Two differences: Firstly, there will be some condemnatory rhetoric, outsourced to the ANC. Secondly, SA mediation will decrease. In regard o the first difference, boistrous rhetoric has never come easily to Zuma. In the (highly unlikely) event that he reverts to "hard diplomacy" this must be read as a sign of presidential weakness (i.e. he's caving in to pressure, rather than instinct). He is a skilled negotiator, with an impressive track record, and knows better than that. The second difference is largely because that mediation has run its course.
8. Foreign Affairs Same trajectory, but with less energy. Foreign policy was Mbeki's baby, but it isn't Zuma's.
9. Liberalism We've already seen the signs of encroaching conservatism. It's too depressing to elaborate. But the president surrounds himself with people to whom liberal rights are nice-to-haves, rather than necessities.
10. The opposition Zuma has done very well at not being Mbeki. The newer you are, the easier it is to play the difference gambit. But as you're steeped deeper into your own regime, the opposition forget about their grudge against your predecessor, and hone resentment focussed on you. Time passes between when you've offered to listen carefully to their concerns, and when you've (still not) actioned them. In the end it becomes clear (as it should have been at the start) that they weren't looking to be listened to. They wanted to be obeyed. You then have to break the news that this won't happen. The chats become less cordial.
I anticipate that within two years Zuma will have lost his reputation as an engaging listener. For action-oriented reasons.
I could go on, but my nails need biting...
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