Friday, November 27, 2009

Sharing is Caring

Hopefully, I can lure the esteemed Dr Adam Haupt to respond to this faintly provocative article on file sharing.

Monday, November 23, 2009

Afghani-stunned

Lucretius refers us to William Polk's "thoughtful, comprehensive, piece‏"


(Find "polk" after your browser has landed.)

Thursday, September 24, 2009

Friday, September 18, 2009

By the pricking of my thumb...

... something in a kanga this way has come.

By the way - next time I bite my thumbnail, the very last bit of election stain will vanish from me. I fear that this'll happen soon, as I've manufactured some stress for myself. So here - without warning - are my warning flags for the "new" administration.

1. 100 daze - The first 100 days are a phoney marker, but by now we have a sense of how the rest of the first term will unfold. This is a list of things to look out for.

2. Red alert How Red will Zuma be? This question is exaggerated by several factors. First is the latent paranoia of those of us who still seek the red peril, after all these years. Second is the state of the Communist Party itself. The only Red pressure is from Blade Nzimande, so as long as he's onside, his party's under control. Conversely, when he's been sidelined, the phantom party he's been fronting can be safely (perhaps permanently) ignored. Which brings us to...

3. COSATU We don't know the nature of the pressure that COSATU will exert on the regime, since all we see of the union is its Secretary. Under the surface, there's a lot more support for centrist positions that Vavi's rambling would suggest. So COSATU needs to resolve. If Vavi's grip on it intensifies, there's the potential for increased pressure. But it's only potential, because union bargaining power is limited (by fatigue, largely.) If it loosens, then COSATU will democratise, and offer less of a coherent threat to government (largely because it will focus on the rather more boring bread-and-butter of industrial engagement.)

4. Style Zuma's style is based on survival, rather than advocacy. He doesn't stand for anything as doggedly as his predecessor. This makes him rather more prone to influence. And open to bargaining. At this point the ANC's internal king-makers are the chief candidates for the bending of the presidential ear. This explains why the succession debate has hotted up so quickly within the alliance. Under Mbeki, apparatchiks would get somewhere by convincing the big man of their attractiveness as hatcheteers. Under Zuma, you have to show that his survival is in your hands. COSATU is next in line.

5. Crime This will continue the trajectory of the last fifteen years. If there are silver bullets waiting to be executed, Zuma is unaware of them, and we shouldn't count on their immediate entry mshini yakhe (into the Presidential machine gun) upon discovery. The experience over the last decade and a half is one of spiraling crime, followed by a gradual downward management.

6. AIDS See "Crime" above. The chief constraint is money, and coverage will expand in line with a reduction in costs. So the trajectory of the last 15 years will continue: increased coverage in tandem with cost reduction and the building (first!) of administrative capacity. The focus, as always, will be on prevention, rather than treatment. The marker for all of this will be the evolution of the government's medium term treatment plan. Historically it's improved as it's become more doable. This'll go on...

7. Zimbabwe Two differences: Firstly, there will be some condemnatory rhetoric, outsourced to the ANC. Secondly, SA mediation will decrease. In regard o the first difference, boistrous rhetoric has never come easily to Zuma. In the (highly unlikely) event that he reverts to "hard diplomacy" this must be read as a sign of presidential weakness (i.e. he's caving in to pressure, rather than instinct). He is a skilled negotiator, with an impressive track record, and knows better than that. The second difference is largely because that mediation has run its course.

8. Foreign Affairs Same trajectory, but with less energy. Foreign policy was Mbeki's baby, but it isn't Zuma's.

9. Liberalism We've already seen the signs of encroaching conservatism. It's too depressing to elaborate. But the president surrounds himself with people to whom liberal rights are nice-to-haves, rather than necessities.

10. The opposition Zuma has done very well at not being Mbeki. The newer you are, the easier it is to play the difference gambit. But as you're steeped deeper into your own regime, the opposition forget about their grudge against your predecessor, and hone resentment focussed on you. Time passes between when you've offered to listen carefully to their concerns, and when you've (still not) actioned them. In the end it becomes clear (as it should have been at the start) that they weren't looking to be listened to. They wanted to be obeyed. You then have to break the news that this won't happen. The chats become less cordial.
I anticipate that within two years Zuma will have lost his reputation as an engaging listener. For action-oriented reasons.

I could go on, but my nails need biting...

Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Bubblewatch

I missed the midpoint of 2009. My diary reveals that on June 30 I trotted off to the Centre for Conflict Resolution (Africa's premier think-tank) for the launch of Terry Bell's self published book on Moses Mayekiso. Both were in attendance. Barbara pimped the book loyally at the door. She also distributed postcards for Terry's no-VAT-on-books campaign. And so forth.

But I should have delivered an interim report on my "Whip out the Bubbly" blog. Well...

1. The JP Morgan US Bond Index is down 5% for the year. A fizz, more than a pop, but there's more of the year left yet. We were on queue with the order, as this one cracked even as the note was written. Arguably, the top was in the last week of December.

2. The presidential popping has been pretty well covered in recent weeks. Zogby had him breeching 50% (southward!). Who would've thought? (Actually, I did - see the Inauguration Special.) It's early, and you could see him tease 60% again, but that's going to require a special event. So I stick with my earlier remarks. Again, we were right in placing this second in order. The only thing I got wrong was that Healthcare woudld be implicated in the softening.

3. And then there was China. It's arguable whether this bubble is going to pop. Immediately this means that I was right on the order. But there'll be egg-eating unless something interesting happens between now and year-end. The data is mixed. China is at what I call the fore-hindisight phase: all the stuff we'd cite in an I-told-you-so are in evidence (e.g. export collapse, reserve risk) but the negatives have been tempered by positive data coming from reporting domains that the Chinese authorities are able to manipulate.

Spring threatens. Let's sit out the rest of the year.

Thursday, June 4, 2009

By the way...

I found this interesting:
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/01/the_obama_infatuation_96768.html

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

State of the Notion

I don't know what to expect, but I do believe that afterward you'll here the DA come as close as ever to effusive praise. This'll have little to do with the content of the speech, and lots to do with credit extension. Simply put, they'll be investing in future critique, when they'll be able to point out that they were initially supportive. It makes sense to do so early in the honeymoon, when there's little tangible substance for a fight (because Zuma can blame anything tangible on his last-but-one predecessor.) Also, it'll soften Zille's kanga blowback.

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Awuleth'u polltracker wham.

Sadly, this post was deleted in error. I await confirmation that it can be retreived from the server. On the upside, it was a very short post predicting the outcome of the SA election. It's essentially completely recalled below:


  • African Nation Congress 63%

  • Democratic Alliance 14%

  • Congress of the People 10%%

  • Inkatha Yesizwe Nonkululekho x%



The comments are original and, accordingly, still refer.

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Chomsky to be sued for copyleft infringement

"Obama's insistence that only Abbas and Fayyad exist conforms to the consistent Western contempt for democracy unless it is under control. Obama provided the usual reasons for ignoring the elected government led by Hamas." -Chomsky, January 26, 2009.

" Importantly, Obama will continue Bush's democracy boycott - failing to recognise the democratically elected Hamas government." TrueCents, January 20, 2009

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Inauguration Special

In a few hours, a tearful George Bush will wave the White House goodbye, as he's whisked to Texas from the presidential helipad. America will be plunged into an unprecedented crisis: how to deploy it's most malapropped president onto the lecture circuit. While it ponders that conundrum, Barack Obama will carve out the legacy of the 44th President. A preview:

Tone: Obama's tone will generally be much (much) more palatable than Bush's. The ugly stuff will be concealed, rather than trumpeted proudly.

Style: Just as the Obama campaing reprised themes from Bush/Cheney2000, there'll be similarities in style between the two. Don't expect Clinton-style micromanagement. Like bush, Obama will be a coordinator of people who do the actual work. He'll rule with decreasing authority over the camps, and focus his energies on projecting outward to the people (American and otherwise). He won't take month-long holidays.

the first 100 days: Barring a surprise crisis, we'll still be in honeymoon territory. There'll be softening of the approval rating, but nothing worrisome. The time will have been spent basking in goodwill.

The bubble: Obama kicks off with a staggering 86% approval rating. In constrast, Bush leaves with (according to CBS) a 22% rating. This is remarkable. After the biggest economic collapse in a lifetime, the failure of wars of aggression against two of the world's militarily most denuded countries, and the largest fiscal deficit in the history of the dollar, you need to select only five Americans to hear the opinion that Bush is doing a good (not just OK) job. The comaprison with the Bush's is interesting. W holds the record for the highest ever approval rating (92%) as well as lowest (19%). By implication he has endured the greatest bubble pop, with 73% of Americans going 180 on him. Obama's initial rating is unprecedented. This means that he'll lose points during the first year. A twenty point drop will bring him into the mid 60's, which is an attractive rating anywhere in the world. When he breaches 50-something, he has cause for concern, as no full-term president other than Regan and Johnson has managed a V-shaped rating curve. And Johnon had victory in the World War II to help him.
Ratings are driven by public ennui, and his biggest worry is that the American public will tire of their gut-curdling ride on the credit-coaster. 50-something approval points signals a bursting of the Obama-bubble, and a retreat to normalcy. I think we'll see this in the first year. After that, we won't see a sharp V, unless there's war or a significant terrorist attack.

The Economy: Obama's differences with Bush over the economy mirror the two's difference over the war in Iraq: the central pivot is not an in-princile difference, as much as the hindsighted confidence that Obama could have handled it better. Obama supporters will, no doubt, counter that he "opposed the war from the start", without considering his support for the no-fly regime, itself a unilateral act of aggression. Digressions aside, the convergence of opinion was elegantly demonstrated in the week of the first presidential debate, when Obama joined Bush in battling populist Republican resistance to TARP. The Obama team was pleased to point out that even John McCain, whose first interjection was timed forty minutes after the start of the discussion, was less enthused about TARP than his reformist rival. Much had been written long before about the conservatising influence of Obama's Chicago confidantes like Austen Goolsbee, foreshadowing a critique fleshed out following the staff announcements of the Obama shadow treasury (wisely postponed until after the election). Without rehashing too much of what's already been noted, Obama's management of the US economy will be difficult.

Foreign relations: For economic reasons, Mexico and China will overshadow Britain, and Iraq. In about a year David Cameron will be sworn in as the British Prime Minister. Any special relationship won't be based on hope and change. Obama will - very willingly and comfortably - deal direct with Europe, but will find it no more tractable than it was for his predecessor.

Bush. The reason that the rest of the world was happy to see Obama is that they believe him to be less threatening (i.e. more pliable) than Bush. Note that Medvedev waited until after the US polls had closed before announcing his European missile plans. He preferred not having that fight with McCain.

Israel/Palestine: Obama will deliver a speech, widely recognised as groundbreaking in it's recognition of Palestinian rights. it will criticise the tenor (but not the content) of past American involvement, and will invoke (probably explicitly) the two-state imperative. While the speech will promise an energised American engagement, it will stop short of imposing clear conditions on the extention of American diplomatic support and aid to Israel. Importantly, Obama will continue Bush's democracy boycott - failing to recognise the democratically elected Hamas government. This is not to say that Palestinian justice won't advance, but as in Iraq will be driven by internal dynamics. Under Obama, American influence will have a net retarding effect.

Africa: Obama will struggle to match Bush's factorfold increase of aid commitment, although he could (but probably won't) improve the gap between pledges and grants. Trade between the US and Africa will be increasingly marked by protectionist American concerns. Look out for an open resource war between the US and China, fought in Africa. The casualty of this will be African development. I exepect Obama to keep Bush's CENTCOM expansion plans on the backburner, as opposed to the dustbin. He is capable of authorign bombing raids a la the Somali raids during Bush's second term, but will do a better job of making the case.

Obama's war: The Status of Forces agreement signalled the end of American involvement in Iraq. The rest is mopping up. Obama will implement a surge strategy in Afghanistan, creating a temporary semblance of stability under whose cover he can execute a roughly dignified exit from a war which - bizarrely - he's invested in. So much for the inherited conflict. Obama will pursue agressive action in Latin America. Not a full-scale invasion, but a sovereignty-busting attack. The conflict triggered will not be of the scale required to resucsitate the economy (which doesn't preclude something else doing that).

Guantanamo Bay: On Day1 President Obama will issue a decree closing the site. This will signal a continuation of the Clinton-Bush approach to prisoner rights, for while Obama will reach for the theatrics of closing the site, he'll studiously avoid the issue of prisoner rights. This must include legal representation, habeus corpus (I expect Obama to be a more convincing salesperson of the Bush tradition of denyign habeus), full disclosure to human rights bodies, access to relatives, due process in a properly constituted court of law, desisting from arbitrary arrest, and so forth. These Bush-era elements will remain intact. The clue to this is the arithmatic around Guantanamo itself. A Brookings Institute report shows that two thirds of the Guantanamo detained prisoners aren't there any longer. In addition, we believe (the figures aren't disclosed, for obvious reasons) that Guantanamo inmates constitute a minorirty of America's illegally-held prison population, the rest of whom live in so-called black sites. Because these sites have been outside of public scrutiny, the President will have no cause to close them. Expect at least some of the newly liberated Guantanamo inmates to find new digs in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Diego Garcia, Afghanistan, and who knows where else. Even those transferred to America can't expect the sort of trial that Americans (like Timothy McVeigh who - unlike the vast majority of Guantanamo detainees - actually was a terrorist).

Healthcare: When Obama leaves office a remarkable number of Americans will have remarkably enhanced access to medical care. This will be the single biggest acheivement of his presidency.

Black America: Black America will end it's tenure under Obama slightly worse off than it began. It's relative (to White America) exposure to social ills (poverty, prison, substance abuse, violent crime, HIV infection, etc.) will be slightly higher, and it's relative exposure to social benefits (wealth, health, security, employment) will be lower. This won't be Obama's fault; as America enters a period of diminished prosperity (i.e. negative real per capita GDP growth), long-standing social fissures are deepened. No one president can stem that in a single term (although perpetuation is a piece of cake). Neither will this imply the absence of signs of progress. A greater number of Black Americans will be receving a larger amount of healthcare covereage, quality education and (maybe) employment.

2012: Obama will face no Democratic challengers in the primaries. He may be Clinton-weak at his reelection, and will be helped by a lacklustre, ill-prepared republican campaing. The Republican frontrunners will be Jeb Bush, Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee and Piyush Jindall. It's way early, but I think that Romney's the candidate to watch. The next tier may include Charles Christ, Tom Ridge and rudi Gulliani. Whether the Republicans unseat Obama depends largely on their performance in the 2010 mid-terms, and their mastery of populist politics starting today. The four key tasks are:
  1. fence-mending with Latino Americans
  2. Pragmatic economic populism
  3. candidate selection
  4. repairing thetechnology gap.
At this stage, they're able to pull it off, although GOP knee-jerks threaten all four.

Unraveling: Obama's juggernaut-of-rivals will give way to a more focussed, coherent, administration. The peripheral elements (like Paul Volker) will give way to the core, so that within two years the administration will look a lot more trim. If this is well managed (gently picking off the elements one-by-one), it will herald an unremarkable transition from a campaign of transformative insurgence to a conservative administration. If it's poorly managed it could spark divisive revenge from the outgunned rivals. Either way, the implementors of Clinton's triangulation will reintroduce centreism as the animating theme of the adminstration. This time, the chastening effect of the economic fallout will double the conservatising impulse.

Success: Obama won't be considered one of the worst. It's unlikely that he'll be remembered as a one of the best (excluding Dem partisans). Remember that Carter presided over a closing of America's inflation problem, but was rewarded by losing his party's nomination for reelection. Presidential success admits a gap between perception and reality. America rarely falls over (a consequence of its long history of developed markets and civil institutions). In order to increase his shot at success, he'll have to be pragmatic about which promises he'll ditch at the outset, and which he'll focus on. I expect him to do this.

Wednesday, January 7, 2009

Gaza

(* I attach the text of a received email*)

> Hi,
>
> I have been so disgusted by the Israeli action in Gaza but so confused
> by conflicting messages. It is hard to know what to think, and what to
> do.
>
> The most cogent account I have found, with context, especially about
> Hamas coming to power, and the sorry story of of Gaza after 40 years
> occupation and then the last two years in which it has been turned
> into a vast open-air prison, is this one from Avi Shlaim, an Oxford
> Professor:
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/07/gaza-israel-palestine
>
> Shlaim is one of the "new historians" like Benny Morris, who have
> questioned some of the founding 'myths' of the problem. He is maligned
> in places on the internet, but I suppose people who tell the truth (or
> even half the truth) will always have detractors. I am sure that much
> could be argued with in his account above, but much of it also rings
> true with me.
>
> I have been wondering what to do. Not just about this episode, but
> about the problem of Israel and the Palestinians in general.
>
> Some of my friends in the UK have been boycotting Israel for years
> (e.g fruit and vegetable products in UK supermarkets), and I am
> feeling that I should now do the same. This won't matter much, but a
> collective attitude would, and so presumably would enough people in
> the US calling their congress-people, etc. Interestingly, the leader
> of the opposition liberal democrats in the UK called today for a
> suspension of UK arms to Israel (more than 20 million pounds worth in
> the first three months of 2008), and of EU arms to Israel. [This is
> not to mention the several billions of dollars per year in US aid to
> Israel].
>
> Sanctions on south africa were a key factor (although I guess it's
> debatable how key) that led the regime to eventually talk with the
> "terrorists" and then compromise and share power.
>
> Interested in your views,

Friday, January 2, 2009

Whip out the bubbly...

I liked 2008. It just didn't turn out as it should have. But it was a nice year. In principle.

OK, in lieu of resolutions (which impose too much responsibility on the offerer), and hot on the heels of the last quarter's bubble-popping frenzy (the housing bubble, the securitisation bubble, the investment banking bubble, etc.) allow me to present the next three bubbles.

First, a disclaimer. I can't deny that there'll be other bubble-bursts inbetween (eg. Vanity Fair warn convincingly of an impending private equity pop). Second, they may not all pop this year. But I have tried to lay them out in the order I think they'll unfold. So here goes:

1. The US treasury. This is a stealth bubble, inflated by Bush, longstanding hubris, and latterly the Federal Reserve Bank. The unravelling will take the form of an increased impotence, as the government finds itself unable to intervene effectively. Treasury bond yields will rise, and the coporate spread will narrow. This means that the government's ability to borrow will weaken. Given that it's voluntarilly weakened its ability to raise taxes, and it's in deficit, Americans will learn the meaning of the Afrikaans post New Year phenomenon bubble-las.

2. Barack Obama. This one was popping last September, until in a rare example of an implosion shielding another implosion, the panic stemming from the housing collapse kept it going. More on this in my Jan20 note.

3. China. It's a long story, but China's been poorly managed for a long time. The banks have been a mess. It's been as dependent on overstretched Americans as the rest of us. Let's not get started on the politics, save to say that rich people don't like having their own freedom restricted. And there's an increasing amount of wealth in China. This reduces the effectiveness of extreme goverment efforts at gerrymandering the economy.
Initially, there'll be firesale attempts at prolonging the implosion. Invariably, these involve selling the most recent stocks of the familly silver (or china). In this case, they're US treasry bonds. I forget the numbers, but the overwhelming majority (80% order of magnitude) of new American borrowing over the last years has been from China. This is why in my list China is #3, and the American treasury #1. In a reversal of the bubble altruism that propelled Obama to November, we have here a case of a bubble pressganging another bubble.

OK, then. Crappy New Year.