As hate-mongering rightwing nuts have (correctly) pointed out, Obama announced his new Afghan strategy as far back as March. So it's kinda weird that a professor from Chicago should now be gently prodding The Great Transformer out of Afghanistan. The heady hope campaign seems so far away.
Conservatism aside, I preferred Leno: "Don't expect a decision on Afghanistan soon. Remember, the puppy took five months."
The views below aren't mine. They were mailed to me, and I post them here for your (whoever you are) viewing pleasure.
I must say I didn't find the analysis in this article all that convincing.
To take one example. Polk refers to "fighting the insurgency with about 60,000 American troops and 68,197 mercenaries" - the Afghan army, the +/-40,000 non-US ISAF troops, the fact that the "insurgents" are not a single entity - all are ignored to present a simplistic us vs. them argument.
Also, note that Polk made a similar argument about Iraq in 2006 - along the lines that the insurgency was unstoppable etc. etc.
I went to hear Petraeus's strategist David Kilcullen (actually not an "armchair warrior" but an experienced counter-insurgency combat commander) speak at the Writer's Festival. While one might not find such people morally appealing, I had to admire his strategic subltety.
To give a brief example: "Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy –day-tripping like a tourist in hell – degrades situational awareness, makes you a target and is ultimately more dangerous."
This is a long way from the brute force tactics of the Soviets or the US in Vietnam. I am not saying that this means the US can win the war, but it makes Polk's analysis of US military strategy ("in General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency doctrine, the accepted ratio of soldiers to natives is 20 to 25 per thousand native") sound jejune at best.
Anyway, I look forward to your swift denunciation of my views.
Here, out of the goodness of my heart, I paste part I of the response from Lucretius:
I am not expert on the matters Polk discusses, and I see that one might take Kilkullen into account too [I had a read of his legendary counter-insurgency manual online and read some other stuff by him, for example, how much he excoriated the Bushies for going to war in Iraq in the first place - but then stated that one can't cry over spilt milk and advocated 'getting the job done'. I suppose one could say that counter-insurgency in Iraq had some success: but, one does not hear too much about the collateral damage, see what that depleted uranium did: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/13/falluja-cancer-children-birth-defects)]. My 'feeling' from what I read, especially about the complexity concerning Pakistan, see Seymour Hersch's new piece here concerning Pakistan's nuclear weapons: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/11/16/091116fa_fact_hersh is that it's going to be very hard for the US and its allies to "win" anything in Afghanistan by fighting the Taliban with 40 thousand more troops, 100 000 mercenaries, and no matter how many more subsequent troops. Apart from the historical expertise of people like Polk, part of his argument that I find convincing is the sheer financial cost. This could drag on at $200 billion per year at a time when the US economy is perillous enough that people can't afford Turkeys on Thanksgiving, when education is being cut, when healthcare reform is in jeapardy over costs, when the US dollar is weakened, etc. etc. It's my feeling that such military action in the context of the corruption of Karzai, the ISI support for Taliban (via same US dollars) and all the extreme complexity of Afpak and Pak/Indian tensions, is not going to work without some huge diplomatic and policy shifts (and it's those shifts and not the 'war' that really matters). Notwithstanding what eat-them-nails-for-breakfast-and-cover-up-fratricide-and-be-bush-cheneys-best-buddy McChrystal says it's not even clear what the objective is. At least it's not clear to this taxpayer. Can you tell me what the objective is? If the objective is preventing the Taliban from coming back so that Al Q does not have a base (which is what passes for mainstream explanation in these parts), that's pretty laughable. Al Q no more needs Afghanistan than it needs Yemen or Somalia, and in any event, the 9/11 attackers had next to nothing to do with Afghanistan. They got their training via European grad school and US flight school, and grew up in Saudi. It's also a laughable proposition when one learns that Karzai has invited a major leader of the Taliban (Haqqani) to be his prime minister (the same Taliban leader who apparently allowed Bin Laden to escape, and the same man who Charlie Wilson referred to in the soviet-afghan war as "pure goodness" being the hero of US supported Mujahideen, and most recently Bin Laden's main ally).
Part II of Lucretius's response: I have been a strong supporter of Obama, as Neil knows, and still supportive. Obama has already done some strikingly good things and is attempting much more (notwithstanding the idiotic and resolute opposition en bloc from the obstructionist republicans). But my support weakens daily as a function of his apparent resolution to escalate this conflict (and also because of the, in my view, very crap management of the financial crisis, chiefly in the persons of Summers, Geithner and co - the fox minding the henhouse so to speak). I said privately last week that if Obama escalates in Afghanistan, while picking up his peace prize with the other, then he's let me down. I guess I shouldn't go that far - yet. It's hard to know what to make of the Afpak thing unless one's steeped in the history of the region and privy to major strategic and policy information. Maybe you can enlighten me about the objectives and what can be achieved through more war. I'd say this, if Obama escalates and without some quick success in concurrent major foreign policy initiative with Pakistan/India, and I don't see something positive in a year, then all impressive reform he's done and is trying won't count for much because this country will be nailed to the graveyard of empires and everything will keep going south.
1. "If the objective is preventing the Taliban from coming back so that Al Q does not have a base (which is what passes for mainstream explanation in these parts), that's pretty laughable." My understanding is that this has always been Obama's objective - from the time of his candidacy, when he described Afghanistan as a "necessary war."
2. Your remarks about Haqqani resonate. The enthusiasm for forging alliances with Afghans ignores the fact that precisely such alliances, forged under Rumsfeld's watch, allowed Bin Laden to flee Tora Bora in 2001.
3. "But my support weakens daily as a function of his apparent resolution to escalate this conflict." It's a little late for that now. To his credit, Obama the candidate was clear on his desire to escalate Afghanistan once in office.
4. "and also because of the, in my view, very crap management of the financial crisis, chiefly in the persons of Summers, Geithner and co - the fox minding the henhouse so to speak." When Obama appointed those people, you described them as a "dream team." I still have the email. During the campaign, when I mailed you Naomi Klein's Chicago Boys article, in which she warned precisely that Obama's transformative rhetoric is undermined by his reliance on conservative economists (henhouse foxes like Austan Goolsbee) your response was that "one can always find critics." So I'm not getting your newfound enthusiasm for old critique.
5. "Maybe you can enlighten me about the objectives and what can be achieved through more war." This Tuesday Obama will deliver an enlightening speech at the Westpoint Academy. He'll announce that the objective is to disrupt (not defeat) Al Qaeda, and then allow the Afghans time to fortify without Talib pressure. Then America will leave. In short, he'll promise (repromise actually, 'cause he said the same thing in March) to implement the McCain/Palin strategy of a surge. The only difference is he'll withdraw afterward.
6. Your concern about the costs is well placed. But as Stigliz and Bilmes have pointed out, the major burden is not the operating cost (which you've quoted) but the opportunity costs and veteran bills that ammortise over years during and well after the conflict. Under Obama's watch US casualties in Afghanistan have mounted. He's also indicated a desire to stay in Iraq beyond the deadline negotiated by Bush. This will add to these expenses.
5 comments:
As hate-mongering rightwing nuts have (correctly) pointed out, Obama announced his new Afghan strategy as far back as March. So it's kinda weird that a professor from Chicago should now be gently prodding The Great Transformer out of Afghanistan. The heady hope campaign seems so far away.
Conservatism aside, I preferred Leno:
"Don't expect a decision on Afghanistan soon. Remember, the puppy took five months."
The views below aren't mine. They were mailed to me, and I post them here for your (whoever you are) viewing pleasure.
I must say I didn't find the analysis in this article all that convincing.
To take one example. Polk refers to "fighting the insurgency with about 60,000 American troops and 68,197 mercenaries" - the Afghan army, the +/-40,000 non-US ISAF troops, the fact that the "insurgents" are not a single entity - all are ignored to present a simplistic us vs. them argument.
Also, note that Polk made a similar argument about Iraq in 2006 - along the lines that the insurgency was unstoppable etc. etc.
I went to hear Petraeus's strategist David Kilcullen (actually not an "armchair warrior" but an experienced counter-insurgency combat commander) speak at the Writer's Festival. While one might not find such people morally appealing, I had to admire his strategic subltety.
To give a brief example:
"Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy –day-tripping like a tourist in hell – degrades situational awareness, makes you a target and is ultimately more dangerous."
This is a long way from the brute force tactics of the Soviets or the US in Vietnam. I am not saying that this means the US can win the war, but it makes Polk's analysis of US military strategy ("in General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency doctrine, the accepted ratio of soldiers to natives is 20 to 25 per thousand native") sound jejune at best.
Anyway, I look forward to your swift denunciation of my views.
Here, out of the goodness of my heart, I paste part I of the response from Lucretius:
I am not expert on the matters Polk discusses, and I see that one might take Kilkullen into account too [I had a read of his legendary counter-insurgency manual online and read some other stuff by him, for example, how much he excoriated the Bushies for going to war in Iraq in the first place - but then stated that one can't cry over spilt milk and advocated 'getting the job done'. I suppose one could say that counter-insurgency in Iraq had some success: but, one does not hear too much about the collateral damage, see what that depleted uranium did: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/13/falluja-cancer-children-birth-defects)]. My 'feeling' from what I read, especially about the complexity concerning Pakistan, see Seymour Hersch's new piece here concerning Pakistan's nuclear weapons: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/11/16/091116fa_fact_hersh is that it's going to be very hard for the US and its allies to "win" anything in Afghanistan by fighting the Taliban with 40 thousand more troops, 100 000 mercenaries, and no matter how many more subsequent troops. Apart from the historical expertise of people like Polk, part of his argument that I find convincing is the sheer financial cost. This could drag on at $200 billion per year at a time when the US economy is perillous enough that people can't afford Turkeys on Thanksgiving, when education is being cut, when healthcare reform is in jeapardy over costs, when the US dollar is weakened, etc. etc. It's my feeling that such military action in the context of the corruption of Karzai, the ISI support for Taliban (via same US dollars) and all the extreme complexity of Afpak and Pak/Indian tensions, is not going to work without some huge diplomatic and policy shifts (and it's those shifts and not the 'war' that really matters). Notwithstanding what eat-them-nails-for-breakfast-and-cover-up-fratricide-and-be-bush-cheneys-best-buddy McChrystal says it's not even clear what the objective is. At least it's not clear to this taxpayer. Can you tell me what the objective is? If the objective is preventing the Taliban from coming back so that Al Q does not have a base (which is what passes for mainstream explanation in these parts), that's pretty laughable. Al Q no more needs Afghanistan than it needs Yemen or Somalia, and in any event, the 9/11 attackers had next to nothing to do with Afghanistan. They got their training via European grad school and US flight school, and grew up in Saudi. It's also a laughable proposition when one learns that Karzai has invited a major leader of the Taliban (Haqqani) to be his prime minister (the same Taliban leader who apparently allowed Bin Laden to escape, and the same man who Charlie Wilson referred to in the soviet-afghan war as "pure goodness" being the hero of US supported Mujahideen, and most recently Bin Laden's main ally).
Part II of Lucretius's response:
I have been a strong supporter of Obama, as Neil knows, and still supportive. Obama has already done some strikingly good things and is attempting much more (notwithstanding the idiotic and resolute opposition en bloc from the obstructionist republicans). But my support weakens daily as a function of his apparent resolution to escalate this conflict (and also because of the, in my view, very crap management of the financial crisis, chiefly in the persons of Summers, Geithner and co - the fox minding the henhouse so to speak). I said privately last week that if Obama escalates in Afghanistan, while picking up his peace prize with the other, then he's let me down. I guess I shouldn't go that far - yet. It's hard to know what to make of the Afpak thing unless one's steeped in the history of the region and privy to major strategic and policy information. Maybe you can enlighten me about the objectives and what can be achieved through more war. I'd say this, if Obama escalates and without some quick success in concurrent major foreign policy initiative with Pakistan/India, and I don't see something positive in a year, then all impressive reform he's done and is trying won't count for much because this country will be nailed to the graveyard of empires and everything will keep going south.
Finally, my own response:
1. "If the objective is preventing the Taliban from coming back so that Al Q does not have a base (which is what passes for mainstream explanation in these parts), that's pretty laughable."
My understanding is that this has always been Obama's objective - from the time of his candidacy, when he described Afghanistan as a "necessary war."
2. Your remarks about Haqqani resonate. The enthusiasm for forging alliances with Afghans ignores the fact that precisely such alliances, forged under Rumsfeld's watch, allowed Bin Laden to flee Tora Bora in 2001.
3. "But my support weakens daily as a function of his apparent resolution to escalate this conflict." It's a little late for that now. To his credit, Obama the candidate was clear on his desire to escalate Afghanistan once in office.
4. "and also because of the, in my view, very crap management of the financial crisis, chiefly in the persons of Summers, Geithner and co - the fox minding the henhouse so to speak." When Obama appointed those people, you described them as a "dream team." I still have the email. During the campaign, when I mailed you Naomi Klein's Chicago Boys article, in which she warned precisely that Obama's transformative rhetoric is undermined by his reliance on conservative economists (henhouse foxes like Austan Goolsbee) your response was that "one can always find critics." So I'm not getting your newfound enthusiasm for old critique.
5. "Maybe you can enlighten me about the objectives and what can be achieved through more war." This Tuesday Obama will deliver an enlightening speech at the Westpoint Academy. He'll announce that the objective is to disrupt (not defeat) Al Qaeda, and then allow the Afghans time to fortify without Talib pressure. Then America will leave.
In short, he'll promise (repromise actually, 'cause he said the same thing in March) to implement the McCain/Palin strategy of a surge. The only difference is he'll withdraw afterward.
6. Your concern about the costs is well placed. But as Stigliz and Bilmes have pointed out, the major burden is not the operating cost (which you've quoted) but the opportunity costs and veteran bills that ammortise over years during and well after the conflict. Under Obama's watch US casualties in Afghanistan have mounted. He's also indicated a desire to stay in Iraq beyond the deadline negotiated by Bush. This will add to these expenses.
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