Friday, November 27, 2009
Sharing is Caring
Hopefully, I can lure the esteemed Dr Adam Haupt to respond to this faintly provocative article on file sharing.
Monday, November 23, 2009
Afghani-stunned
Lucretius refers us to William Polk's "thoughtful, comprehensive, piece"
(Find "polk" after your browser has landed.)
Thursday, September 24, 2009
Friday, September 18, 2009
By the pricking of my thumb...
... something in a kanga this way has come.
By the way - next time I bite my thumbnail, the very last bit of election stain will vanish from me. I fear that this'll happen soon, as I've manufactured some stress for myself. So here - without warning - are my warning flags for the "new" administration.
1. 100 daze - The first 100 days are a phoney marker, but by now we have a sense of how the rest of the first term will unfold. This is a list of things to look out for.
2. Red alert How Red will Zuma be? This question is exaggerated by several factors. First is the latent paranoia of those of us who still seek the red peril, after all these years. Second is the state of the Communist Party itself. The only Red pressure is from Blade Nzimande, so as long as he's onside, his party's under control. Conversely, when he's been sidelined, the phantom party he's been fronting can be safely (perhaps permanently) ignored. Which brings us to...
3. COSATU We don't know the nature of the pressure that COSATU will exert on the regime, since all we see of the union is its Secretary. Under the surface, there's a lot more support for centrist positions that Vavi's rambling would suggest. So COSATU needs to resolve. If Vavi's grip on it intensifies, there's the potential for increased pressure. But it's only potential, because union bargaining power is limited (by fatigue, largely.) If it loosens, then COSATU will democratise, and offer less of a coherent threat to government (largely because it will focus on the rather more boring bread-and-butter of industrial engagement.)
4. Style Zuma's style is based on survival, rather than advocacy. He doesn't stand for anything as doggedly as his predecessor. This makes him rather more prone to influence. And open to bargaining. At this point the ANC's internal king-makers are the chief candidates for the bending of the presidential ear. This explains why the succession debate has hotted up so quickly within the alliance. Under Mbeki, apparatchiks would get somewhere by convincing the big man of their attractiveness as hatcheteers. Under Zuma, you have to show that his survival is in your hands. COSATU is next in line.
5. Crime This will continue the trajectory of the last fifteen years. If there are silver bullets waiting to be executed, Zuma is unaware of them, and we shouldn't count on their immediate entry mshini yakhe (into the Presidential machine gun) upon discovery. The experience over the last decade and a half is one of spiraling crime, followed by a gradual downward management.
6. AIDS See "Crime" above. The chief constraint is money, and coverage will expand in line with a reduction in costs. So the trajectory of the last 15 years will continue: increased coverage in tandem with cost reduction and the building (first!) of administrative capacity. The focus, as always, will be on prevention, rather than treatment. The marker for all of this will be the evolution of the government's medium term treatment plan. Historically it's improved as it's become more doable. This'll go on...
7. Zimbabwe Two differences: Firstly, there will be some condemnatory rhetoric, outsourced to the ANC. Secondly, SA mediation will decrease. In regard o the first difference, boistrous rhetoric has never come easily to Zuma. In the (highly unlikely) event that he reverts to "hard diplomacy" this must be read as a sign of presidential weakness (i.e. he's caving in to pressure, rather than instinct). He is a skilled negotiator, with an impressive track record, and knows better than that. The second difference is largely because that mediation has run its course.
8. Foreign Affairs Same trajectory, but with less energy. Foreign policy was Mbeki's baby, but it isn't Zuma's.
9. Liberalism We've already seen the signs of encroaching conservatism. It's too depressing to elaborate. But the president surrounds himself with people to whom liberal rights are nice-to-haves, rather than necessities.
10. The opposition Zuma has done very well at not being Mbeki. The newer you are, the easier it is to play the difference gambit. But as you're steeped deeper into your own regime, the opposition forget about their grudge against your predecessor, and hone resentment focussed on you. Time passes between when you've offered to listen carefully to their concerns, and when you've (still not) actioned them. In the end it becomes clear (as it should have been at the start) that they weren't looking to be listened to. They wanted to be obeyed. You then have to break the news that this won't happen. The chats become less cordial.
I anticipate that within two years Zuma will have lost his reputation as an engaging listener. For action-oriented reasons.
I could go on, but my nails need biting...
By the way - next time I bite my thumbnail, the very last bit of election stain will vanish from me. I fear that this'll happen soon, as I've manufactured some stress for myself. So here - without warning - are my warning flags for the "new" administration.
1. 100 daze - The first 100 days are a phoney marker, but by now we have a sense of how the rest of the first term will unfold. This is a list of things to look out for.
2. Red alert How Red will Zuma be? This question is exaggerated by several factors. First is the latent paranoia of those of us who still seek the red peril, after all these years. Second is the state of the Communist Party itself. The only Red pressure is from Blade Nzimande, so as long as he's onside, his party's under control. Conversely, when he's been sidelined, the phantom party he's been fronting can be safely (perhaps permanently) ignored. Which brings us to...
3. COSATU We don't know the nature of the pressure that COSATU will exert on the regime, since all we see of the union is its Secretary. Under the surface, there's a lot more support for centrist positions that Vavi's rambling would suggest. So COSATU needs to resolve. If Vavi's grip on it intensifies, there's the potential for increased pressure. But it's only potential, because union bargaining power is limited (by fatigue, largely.) If it loosens, then COSATU will democratise, and offer less of a coherent threat to government (largely because it will focus on the rather more boring bread-and-butter of industrial engagement.)
4. Style Zuma's style is based on survival, rather than advocacy. He doesn't stand for anything as doggedly as his predecessor. This makes him rather more prone to influence. And open to bargaining. At this point the ANC's internal king-makers are the chief candidates for the bending of the presidential ear. This explains why the succession debate has hotted up so quickly within the alliance. Under Mbeki, apparatchiks would get somewhere by convincing the big man of their attractiveness as hatcheteers. Under Zuma, you have to show that his survival is in your hands. COSATU is next in line.
5. Crime This will continue the trajectory of the last fifteen years. If there are silver bullets waiting to be executed, Zuma is unaware of them, and we shouldn't count on their immediate entry mshini yakhe (into the Presidential machine gun) upon discovery. The experience over the last decade and a half is one of spiraling crime, followed by a gradual downward management.
6. AIDS See "Crime" above. The chief constraint is money, and coverage will expand in line with a reduction in costs. So the trajectory of the last 15 years will continue: increased coverage in tandem with cost reduction and the building (first!) of administrative capacity. The focus, as always, will be on prevention, rather than treatment. The marker for all of this will be the evolution of the government's medium term treatment plan. Historically it's improved as it's become more doable. This'll go on...
7. Zimbabwe Two differences: Firstly, there will be some condemnatory rhetoric, outsourced to the ANC. Secondly, SA mediation will decrease. In regard o the first difference, boistrous rhetoric has never come easily to Zuma. In the (highly unlikely) event that he reverts to "hard diplomacy" this must be read as a sign of presidential weakness (i.e. he's caving in to pressure, rather than instinct). He is a skilled negotiator, with an impressive track record, and knows better than that. The second difference is largely because that mediation has run its course.
8. Foreign Affairs Same trajectory, but with less energy. Foreign policy was Mbeki's baby, but it isn't Zuma's.
9. Liberalism We've already seen the signs of encroaching conservatism. It's too depressing to elaborate. But the president surrounds himself with people to whom liberal rights are nice-to-haves, rather than necessities.
10. The opposition Zuma has done very well at not being Mbeki. The newer you are, the easier it is to play the difference gambit. But as you're steeped deeper into your own regime, the opposition forget about their grudge against your predecessor, and hone resentment focussed on you. Time passes between when you've offered to listen carefully to their concerns, and when you've (still not) actioned them. In the end it becomes clear (as it should have been at the start) that they weren't looking to be listened to. They wanted to be obeyed. You then have to break the news that this won't happen. The chats become less cordial.
I anticipate that within two years Zuma will have lost his reputation as an engaging listener. For action-oriented reasons.
I could go on, but my nails need biting...
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Bubblewatch
I missed the midpoint of 2009. My diary reveals that on June 30 I trotted off to the Centre for Conflict Resolution (Africa's premier think-tank) for the launch of Terry Bell's self published book on Moses Mayekiso. Both were in attendance. Barbara pimped the book loyally at the door. She also distributed postcards for Terry's no-VAT-on-books campaign. And so forth.
But I should have delivered an interim report on my "Whip out the Bubbly" blog. Well...
1. The JP Morgan US Bond Index is down 5% for the year. A fizz, more than a pop, but there's more of the year left yet. We were on queue with the order, as this one cracked even as the note was written. Arguably, the top was in the last week of December.
2. The presidential popping has been pretty well covered in recent weeks. Zogby had him breeching 50% (southward!). Who would've thought? (Actually, I did - see the Inauguration Special.) It's early, and you could see him tease 60% again, but that's going to require a special event. So I stick with my earlier remarks. Again, we were right in placing this second in order. The only thing I got wrong was that Healthcare woudld be implicated in the softening.
3. And then there was China. It's arguable whether this bubble is going to pop. Immediately this means that I was right on the order. But there'll be egg-eating unless something interesting happens between now and year-end. The data is mixed. China is at what I call the fore-hindisight phase: all the stuff we'd cite in an I-told-you-so are in evidence (e.g. export collapse, reserve risk) but the negatives have been tempered by positive data coming from reporting domains that the Chinese authorities are able to manipulate.
Spring threatens. Let's sit out the rest of the year.
But I should have delivered an interim report on my "Whip out the Bubbly" blog. Well...
1. The JP Morgan US Bond Index is down 5% for the year. A fizz, more than a pop, but there's more of the year left yet. We were on queue with the order, as this one cracked even as the note was written. Arguably, the top was in the last week of December.
2. The presidential popping has been pretty well covered in recent weeks. Zogby had him breeching 50% (southward!). Who would've thought? (Actually, I did - see the Inauguration Special.) It's early, and you could see him tease 60% again, but that's going to require a special event. So I stick with my earlier remarks. Again, we were right in placing this second in order. The only thing I got wrong was that Healthcare woudld be implicated in the softening.
3. And then there was China. It's arguable whether this bubble is going to pop. Immediately this means that I was right on the order. But there'll be egg-eating unless something interesting happens between now and year-end. The data is mixed. China is at what I call the fore-hindisight phase: all the stuff we'd cite in an I-told-you-so are in evidence (e.g. export collapse, reserve risk) but the negatives have been tempered by positive data coming from reporting domains that the Chinese authorities are able to manipulate.
Spring threatens. Let's sit out the rest of the year.
Thursday, June 4, 2009
By the way...
I found this interesting:
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/01/the_obama_infatuation_96768.html
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/01/the_obama_infatuation_96768.html
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
State of the Notion
I don't know what to expect, but I do believe that afterward you'll here the DA come as close as ever to effusive praise. This'll have little to do with the content of the speech, and lots to do with credit extension. Simply put, they'll be investing in future critique, when they'll be able to point out that they were initially supportive. It makes sense to do so early in the honeymoon, when there's little tangible substance for a fight (because Zuma can blame anything tangible on his last-but-one predecessor.) Also, it'll soften Zille's kanga blowback.
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